University of Mississippi

eGrove
Proceedings of the University of Kansas
Symposium on Auditing Problems

Deloitte Collection

1-1-1978

Role of auditing theory in education and practice
Robert E. Hamilton

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Auditing Symposium IV: Proceedings of the 1978 Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on
Auditing Problems, pp. 095-108;

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems by an authorized
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

6
The Role of Auditing Theory in Education and Practice
Robert E. Hamilton
University of Minnesota
A u d i t activities are receiving increased public attention and scrutiny. W i t h
public institutions increasingly being the subject of auditors' activities and with
public disclosure occurring of the financial and operating results of large C P A
firms, there is an increasing demand for explanations of the auditor's role i n
our society. T h e expansion of audit activities performed by governmental, i n ternal, and external auditors likewise has not gone unnoticed. N e w audit procedures, new forms of audit organization, and new institutional arrangements
have been rapidly introduced without a simultaneous infusion of explanations
which are grounded i n theory.
T h e purpose of this paper is to describe the nature of a theory of auditing
which would improve the underpinnings for explanations of audit activities
and to identify specific linkages between improvements i n theory and difficult
problems i n auditing education and practice. A theory of auditing can help i m prove our understanding of the role for auditing i n society and thus improve
the ability of society's members to design institutional structures and to take
actions which lead to desired outcomes.
A u d i t i n g is a term associated with activities having specified characteristics.
A n auditing theory should describe these activities and their particular configurations and intensities. It should explain using differing relative amounts
of substantive and compliance testing and differences i n the amount of resources
used to audit a public versus a private entity. These two matters are but illustrative of a larger set which is concerned w i t h describing why observed auditing
activities are what they are. If this view of auditing theory appears limited,
there is an additional discussion of auditing theory i n a subsequent section of
this paper which should expand the horizon.
T h e remaining sections of this paper are organized i n the following way.
A discussion and review of developments i n auditing theory is presented along
w i t h a description of the characteristics appropriate for an auditing theory. T h e
two subsequent sections contain a more specific discussion and development of
ways i n which auditing theory can impact education and practice. T h e final
section is a prospective on future developments i n auditing theory.
Where are W e i n A u d i t i n g Theory?
Before a role for auditing theory can be identified there exists the steps of
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identifying where we are i n auditing theory. If it is found that no auditing
theory exists then there is extreme difficulty i n an identification of the role for
theory. A t that point the process turns to identifying a role for an auditing
theory if only there were one like the theory under consideration. If the existing
theory is so underdeveloped that it is difficult to show its value, then the issue
is one of identifying the characteristics of a theory which w o u l d likely be of
value. T h e second view is the one that obtains for much of what follows, yet the
prospective indicates some reasons why such a theory can be and is likely to
be produced.
L o o k i n g to a closely related discipline for support revealed that there exists
The Theory of Finance (Fama and Miller, 1972*). T h e claim is that " T h e theory
of finance is concerned with how individuals and firms allocate resources through
time. In particular, it seeks to explain how solutions to the problems faced i n
allocating resources through time are facilitated by the existence of capital
markets, . . . and of firms . . . " If the view of auditing theorists is consistent
w i t h these finance theorists then it could be expected that the theory of auditing
would seek to explain how solutions to problems faced i n allocating resources
through time are facilitated by the existence of auditors, audit firms, and auditing
institutions. W h i l e it may not be the final word on the subject of the theory of
auditing, the preceding description provides a sufficient starting point. In a
simple form, the theory of auditing would explain the auditing activities i n the
world around us. T h e theory may not provide explanations as precise as may
be desired, e.g., w h y some auditors wear vests and others do not. T h e theory
may not tell auditors what they should do i n every conceivable situation, and at
the beginning the predictions of the theory may be surprising and the reasons
may be counter-intuitive. O n l y through significant exposure to the reasoning
and by continued testing and refinement of the theory can it be subjected to
evaluation by individuals who may accept or reject the theory. More is reported
on these points i n the next section of this paper. F o r the moment, the focus is
on the review of existing developments i n auditing theory.
N o lengthy history is provided as there are numerous reports on the history
of developments i n auditing which are more complete than is possible within
the scope of this paper. The additional consideration that there should be continued improvements i n theory suggests that a review of history would wisely
begin as late as possible so as to avoid a lot of changes which are not applicable.
O u r review of auditing theory w i l l begin w i t h the publication of The Philosophy
of Auditing
( M a u t z and Sharaf) and conclude w i t h recent w o r k i n g papers.
A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts ( A S O B A C , 1972) is the second major
audit theory publication during this time period. Numerous papers have developed and studied major elements of an auditing theory, but none are as complete as the two cited works.
In The

Philosophy

of Auditing

it is stated that:

It is our contention that there is a theory of auditing, that there
exist a number of basic assumptions and a body of integrated ideas, the
*See "References" at the conclusion of this paper for this and all other references
similarly cited.
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understanding of which w i l l be of direct assistance i n the development
and practice of the art of auditing. ( M a u t z and Sharaf, 1961, p. 1.)
T h e authors' development proceeds from eight tentative postulates to the description of five auditing concepts: evidence, due audit care, fair presentation, i n dependence, and ethical conduct. T h e process of conceptualizing i n
ASOBAC,
(p. 16), on the other hand, " . . . ends w i t h a normative description and the
pragmatic benefits may not be immediately apparent." H o w does either of these
two works provide a basis for a theory of auditing? T h e first is represented
as the philosophy of auditing and therefore it seems inappropriate to consider
it as an auditing theory. In ASOBAC
(p. 16) there is a representation that
" T h i s study is an attempt to contribute to the development of a theory of auditi n g " and therefore it seems inappropriate to consider it to be a completed auditing
theory. If the characteristics of a theory are present i n either of these works,
there has been sufficient time to refine and test the theory. W h a t has been the
recent history?
Both of these works have been widely quoted and cited i n subsequent reports on studies of auditing so that a broad exposure to the ideas and conclusions
contained i n both ASOBAC
and The Philosophy of Auditing appears to have
resulted. Have these works led to tests of their ideas and conclusions? I am
unaware of any reported empirical test i n auditing which has directly used the
ideas and conclusions i n these works as a means to theoretically support the
tested hypotheses. Instead most, if not all, of the auditing research which uses
observations of audit or audit-related activities has formulated hypotheses i n
an ad hoc manner. Consider, for example, Warren's (1975) test of the uniformity
of auditing standards. In this case, there were a number of hypotheses, each
one of which would provide an hypothesis that the incidence of qualified
opinions would be uniform across C P A firms. T w o of the hypotheses were
competition among C P A firms and uniformity i n application of auditing
standards. Furthermore, it was assumed that there was no selection process
taking place so that audit conditions were considered to be randomly distributed
throughout the firms being studied. None of these necessary theoretical underpinnings come from the existing theories of auditing.
T h e point here is not to single out the W a r r e n study for criticism. Instead,
the study is presented to provide an example, among many others, where it can
be seen that auditing theory has not been directly beneficial i n providing theoretical support for a tested hypothesis. It is beyond the scope of this paper,
however, to demonstrate that existing research has not used the existing theoretical
structure i n auditing for underpinnings. T h e issue here is whether it can be
used, not that there is no current use.
Refinements of Existing Theory
In the second area of questioning, i.e., has the existing theory led to
further refinements, there is also a lack of direct connections. One area that has
received considerable attention is the theory of evidence (Kissinger, 1977; Toba,
1975) as it has been further refined and logically examined from the beginnings
of the concept of evidence as presented i n The Philosophy of Auditing.
ASOBAC
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has been extended by W i l l (1974) to consider the environment which feeds into
and is fed by the audit process. Yet neither of these areas has spawned underpinnings for empirical research. T h e further refinements i n the theory of evidence lack specific relationships to the way i n which particular levels of reliability
are determined and thus have a significant ambiguity which precludes testing.
T h e systems approach presented i n W i l l (1974) adds the consideration of i m portant environmental variables but does not provide for an operational specification sufficient for testing. W h i l e the preceding remarks may appear critical of
auditing theory developments and testing, there is room for an interpretation
that the existing work is exploratory, and significant verifiable results are possible,
but a long way off. Before turning to a discussion of the properties of a theory
of auditing, the following remark made i n The Philosophy of Auditing (p. 65)
is worthy of consideration:
. . . . conceptual models, even without empirical support, can be extremely effective i n the development of theory. T h i s fact is important to
us because we find the development of mathematical models, except
possibly the most simple type, to be inapplicable i n auditing at this stage
of development.
Whether this statement would be different if it had been written i n 1978 instead
of i n 1961 is of interest. Is there reason to believe that movement away from
procedures effective i n developing theory to those effective for testing and validating theories has taken place? Is auditing research still i n the exploratory stage
where existing research has the direction of future research activities as its goals,
or is auditing research providing some knowledge about the world around us?
In the final section on prospectives for auditing theory the more recent developments w i l l be described. A look at the properties for a theory of auditing and its
value is next considered.
Properties of a Theory of A u d i t i n g
One general problem impeding the development and acceptance of auditing
theory is its residence i n the social sciences. Numerous arguments have been
recorded to suggest that social science theory is different and more difficult to
produce than is theory i n the physical sciences. After a physical scientist presents
the theory for behavior of a type of molecule and shows it to be supported by
observation, there is not generally an outcry raised by molecules to reveal their
thoughts that they really do not behave as the model says they do. Yet, if we
look to the social sciences, we often find that this situation applies. Whether the
difference i n the social sciences is supportive or detractive for theory development
is an open question. I suggest, however, that the developments i n the physical
sciences would have been slower if protesting atoms had caused the attention
of researchers to focus on detailed idiosyncracies of their behavior. In attempts
to explain the finest detail, there is often a lost concentration on more general
and likely more readily explainable phenomena. It is merely an issue of first
things first.
W h a t qualities should an auditing theory have? It is obvious that the
answer depends on the context i n which the theory is to be used. In a sense,
98

the production of auditing theory is like the production of technologies for use
i n converting the factors of production into consumer goods. T h e desirability
of qualities for an auditing theory then depends on what products it w i l l produce
and how the products are valued. A u d i t i n g education and audit practice are
examined later as to their use of the products of auditing theory. A t this point, a
general examination of the properties of a theory of auditing is briefly conducted.
A theory of auditing which facilitates comparison w i t h other competing
and complementary theories, which is presented so as to make validation possible
and which provides results of interest to auditing educators and practitioners
would be a significant addition to the current state of auditing theory. T h e
existing theoretical base i n auditing appears not to satisfy these constraints. Use
of a loose conceptualizing approach has hindered comparison and made validation
difficult. If one looks at Toba's theory of audit evidence, its explicit development d i d facilitate the response by Kissinger which has provided a clearer and
more cogent relationship between the theory of evidence and auditors' reporting
alternatives. Yet there is still a way to see if the theory of evidence explains the
actual reporting behavior of auditors. T h e reason is that the theory of evidence
has developed i n isolation of the institutional arrangements which reward and
penalize auditors, clients, and others. It is m u c h closer to a description of one
way i n which an auditor may use evidence, and if the other alternatives are as
explicitly developed, then there is the possibility of testing to see w h i c h theory
best explains the way i n which auditors behave. T h e question of how they
should behave is then an issue i n the design of the institutional arrangements.
If a theory of auditing is to be forthcoming it should include a systematic
consideration of the major elements i n the practice of auditing: the institutional
structure, the market for audited information, the characteristics of agents doing
auditing, being audited, and using audited information, and consider the available auditing technology. W h a t would be the details for the components of an
auditing theory? A simple statement is that it would explain the demand for
and the supply of auditors. Such a theory would permit an analysis of the effects
on the supply of auditing of changing institutional arrangements, of expanding
the subject matter of auditing, and of new technologies for producing audits.
A Simplified V i e w of A u d i t i n g Theory
A t a m i n i m u m , the theory should provide a way to characterize the previously mentioned items and to identify the effects due to their interacting. In
this regard, consider the following simplified view of auditing theory: If there
exists a government to enforce contracts, and due to differences i n wealth endowments, inter. alia., individual agents i n an economy find it advantageous to put
their wealth i n the charge of others, then contracts which reward performance
may be based on numbers reported by the manager. If the owner of the wealth
does not have a way to ensure the compliance of the reports with the contractual
provisions or if the manager does not have a way to convince the owner of this,
then certain contracts may not take place. If an auditor is incorporated into
the arrangement to ascertain compliance and if the auditor is motivated to do
so because of associated rewards and penalties, then valuable contracts could be
formed and all w i l l be better off. T h e preceding is a brief and terse explanation
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of how a theory of auditing may be developed. T h e theory would include the
technology available to the auditor and the way i n which the information being
audited affects the wealth of the owner and manager. T h i s simple setting is
more clearly developed and extended elsewhere ( H a m i l t o n , 1975; Magee, 1977).
T h e essential characteristic of this approach is to rely heavily upon the tools
of economic analysis to provide an explanation of this economic phenomenon—
auditing activity. It should not be that the economic analysis is accepted solely
on the basis of its rigor, but also on its relevance i n rigorously explaining auditing
activities. T o provide details on how a theory w i t h these characteristics w o u l d
assist educators and practitioners, the next two major sections of this paper w i l l
provide a description of major issues that may be explained.
Assistance to A u d i t i n g Education
O n one hand, the area of auditing education may benefit more from psychological theories of learning which say something about the production of education of any type. Yet a careful description of the nature of the learning requirements for auditing is necessary to make valid applications of the theories of
learning. It is i n this realm that auditing theory should be helpful. If, for
example, one is trying to help students understand how to make decisions about
the use of compliance and substantive tests, how does auditing theory help?
D o sufficiently unambiguous definitions exist to permit an observer, armed w i t h
the definitions, to categorize actual audit activities into these two types of tests?
C a n auditing theory demonstrate why it is important to make this choice?
F r o m an economic standpoint, these tests are two different inputs for the production of an audit. It appears that standard analysis would lead to a simple
view of the production possibilities set and explain why the tests should be made
a certain way. If students have an understanding of economic analysis from
prerequisite courses, then it would be an appropriate language for conveying
an audit issue to students.
One advantage i n having a theory of auditing is that it can provide a structure for course content. A n overall view—the theory—can be outlined and then
developed i n detail. T h e critical points of the theory can guide the time allocations for courses and the detailed interrelationships among the theory's elements
can help to avoid misinterpretations based on considering only part of the problem. F o r example, the choice of penalty structure for auditors may be considered
as a factor i n determining what is a reasonable amount of assurance. T h e n it
is possible to say that within this penalty structure the auditor w i l l disclaim if
he cannot obtain enough assurance. Understanding this relationship provides
insights into how the auditor (or a coalition of auditors) would respond to a
proposal which eliminates the option of reporting a disclaimer.
A concern for time allocation to various coverages i n an auditing course
could be aided by a theory of auditing which identifies the major determinants
of the auditor's decision process and how they are affected by changes i n the
environment. Those critical points of influence on audit decisions could be
given sufficient time to assure that they are well understood, with the more
sensitive variables studied i n depth. A u d i t choice variables of a more technological
character, e.g. electronic data processing and statistical sampling techniques,
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could then become topics of much more detailed and specialized courses.
A second advantage is that a theory of auditing should quickly highlight
the differences i n subject matter and environment for the different types of
auditing, e.g. internal, external, and governmental. F r o m this, then, a common
core of knowledge could be identified and specialized aspects of these different areas recognized and covered i n courses which detail the specialized environmental features and how audit decisions are affected thereby.
A third advantage which stems from having a theory of auditing is that
it enables a systematic interpretation of evidence produced by researchers such
that it can be communicated to students. W h e n a student leaves an auditing
class, does the student k n o w what researchers have found as descriptions of audit
activities? A theory of auditing which structures the learning process would
more readily permit an integration of research findings into the classroom.
For example, if auditing theory can describe the effect of audit penalties on audit
decisions, then alternative sampling approaches can be described i n terms of the
effect of the approach on the auditor's likelihood of having penalties imposed
upon h i m . W h e n alternative confirmation techniques are discussed, as i n Professor Sorkin's paper that is included i n the proceedings of this symposium, then
evidence about the reliability and costs of using different approaches can be conveyed to students within the theoretical structure. A major point to be emphasized here is that as a theory of auditing is systematically developed, then researchers' results w i l l be related to the theory and this w i l l hasten the introduction
of those results into the classroom.
A fourth educational advantage derived from auditing theory is that it
provides a rather complete, compact, and precise view of auditing which then
enables a clear focus on the elements which explain why audit activities are what
they are. T h e emphasis here is on providing an explanation which can serve as
an aid to identifying and convincing students why activities which may at first
seem counterintuitive are not necessarily so. T h e theory takes simple and familiar
constructs and shows how they lead to the results. Errors of intuition may be
uncovered and/or errors i n the theory may surface. If the theory of audits is
too simple, this advantage may be lost. M y guess is that when a theory of auditing is developed it w i l l be valuable i n permitting a communication of the complexities of the factors which determine audit activities. Conversely, it w i l l be
difficult to comprehend some of the more important complexities i n the absence
of a theory of auditing.
Additional Advantages Related to Education
T w o remaining advantages deserve attention. Other, less direct, effects
may also be of importance i n education. First, it is likely that a rather general
theory which involves general phenomena w i l l be at the base of a theory of
auditing and that the communication and understanding of this theory w i l l be
of importance to a general business student audience. T h e economics of contracting and the attendant moral hazard and information asymmetry issues appear to be affected by auditing mechanisms. W i t h a generic structure of the
problem there is the possibility that much of this general theory can be covered
i n an introductory course with external auditing, internal auditing and govern101

mental auditing as special cases within the theory of auditing. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) report on a theory of agency which considers the incentives
for monitoring and bonding activities of managers. It is a preliminary start on
what might be the foundation of a theory of auditing. T h e theory then should
be capable eventually of explaining the conditions which result i n auditing activities being done i n different ways within different organizational settings.
Just as micro-economics provides explanations about the production decisions of
firms under different conditions, a theory of auditing would explain the effects
on auditing activities that result from different conditions i n the environment.
In " T h e Role of Securities i n the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing,"
A r r o w (1964) provides an explanation as to the reason why securities are introduced into a society. W i t h i n the study of auditing, it would seem that, at a
m i n i m u m , a theory of auditing should show why an economy w i l l be better off
if auditors can provide their services. Yet, there is currently no well detailed
exposition of this matter, and a theory of auditing which does so w i l l provide
a basis for a body of knowledge of wide applicability. M a n y activities i n society
involve contracting which critically depends on costly verification or observation
mechanisms. Radner (1968) has shown that without mutual observation of
states, there is little to suggest that claims on those states w i l l be traded. A t issue
is the simultaneous consideration of the costs to verify states of the world and
the value from being able to contract and exchange resource claims. Audit-like
activities are a significant resource-consuming process of state verification which
is assumed i n most models of resource allocation mechanisms. A n understanding
of the nature of these activities is essential to understanding why one mechanism
is preferred to another.
T h e second effect of having a theory of auditing which indirectly affects
education is identified w i t h research i n auditing. W i t h a theory, there should
be clearer focus on the major unsolved issues and an easier identification of untested claims so that researchers can more readily identify interesting problems.
By m a k i n g it easier to do research i n auditing, the supply of high quality research
should increase (possibly along w i t h the supply of low quality research as well)
and should enhance the flow of knowledge about the world of auditing to the
student of auditing.
There are many advantages of a theory of auditing for audit education.
Each is dependent upon that theory to generate a complete, compact, and consistent story about auditing activities. W h e n a theory of auditing comes into
existence, there w i l l be a change i n the approach for viewing many aspects of
auditing. A Statement on A u d i t i n g Standards w i l l not be the subject of direct
theoretical validation. Instead, there w i l l be a concern for identifying the factors
which explain why the actions described i n the statement are consistent with
the theory of auditing and for evaluating the effect of the statement on the supply
and demand for audits.
Effect on A u d i t i n g Practice
A recent view of accounting theory production has been that it creates a
product aimed at "the market for excuses" (Watts and Z i m m e r m a n , 1977). A
similar possibility exists for auditing theory. W h e n there are changes i n the
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"rules of the game" which reallocate resources, then there is an incentive for
providing "theory" to support the allocation which favors one group. A n
affected group seeks the "theory" that w i l l support a resulting allocation that w i l l
be i n their favor.
T o understand the incentives for buying excuses it is necessary to have a
theory to explain how the activities of the world would change as the "rules of
the game" are changed. T h i s type of theory is not of the excusing type but of
the explaining variety. T h i s theory would explain which groups w i l l buy which
excuses. A theory of auditing would, i n general, seek to explain why auditing
is a preferred social activity, and i n the process identify the specific nature of
the effects of introducing auditing as these effects relate to resource allocations
and production plans.
In audit practice, there are at least four aspects of choice problems concerned
w i t h auditing: the individual auditor, the C P A firm, the auditing profession,
and the social choice mechanism. A theory of auditing would seek to explain
how these choice problems are resolved. F o r example, at the individual auditor
level there are numerous problems of choice that are dependent upon an individual's position i n the firm. One of the more important types of individual
auditor activities is concerned w i t h characterizing different client settings and
selecting from among alternative ways of obtaining evidence. A t this level of
choice, there is essentially a production technology problem. T h e assistance
would come i n the form of a theory which identified the major distinct characteristics of clients and related them to their effects on the cost and reliability of
alternative types of evidence.
A t the individual choice level, it would be expected that the theory of
auditing would identify the advantages of using both local (or individual)
auditor knowledge and the advantages of using specialists i n other types of
knowledge to aid i n the acquisition of evidence. A t the individual auditor level,
the theory would be heavily embedded i n the technology of evidence collection.
Evaluation of the evidence and choosing specific forms of evidence would likely
be subject to significant influences from elsewhere.
In a C P A firm wherein there is a sharing of risks, there would be benefit
to including a theory of risk sharing to assist i n explaining how firms are organized. D o monetary incentives to auditors improve the risk sharing, or are
quality control reviews and admonitions more effective? A r e the clients i n the
C P A firm's portfolio of clients consistent with the firm's members' attitudes toward risk? Recent advances i n team theory, syndicate theory and other areas
provide a structure for evaluating this type of firm policy. A n understanding
of portfolio theory can provide the basis for examining the effects of client m i x
on audit risk, although this is a difficult application since the major step involves
characterizing audit risks i n the portfolio context. Obvious advantages from
specialization also influence the solution to the client m i x problem. T h e characteristics (or attributes) of individual auditors within the C P A firm are another
dimension which is the subject of a firm's recruiting and training policies. T h e
structure and size of C P A firms make them a rather interesting and unique
object for research.
A t the professional level there is a choice problem concerning the activities
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of the profession and its ability to serve its constituency. Essentially, coalition
actions are taken, and they should likely be i n the best interests of the coalitions.
W h e n they are not, there is an increasing likelihood that the coalition w i l l splinter,
as has been the recent experience of the A I C P A with respect to a revision i n its
structure to recognize two different types of practice. Professional activities i n clude other functions such as the efficient production and dissemination of specialized knowledge. These activities are also capable of analysis i n economic
terms. W h e n the total professional fund is unequally provided by members and
the services are unevenly valued, there is a concern for the stability of the coalition.
A theory of auditing can assist the profession i n at least one other way.
W i t h the profession serving to represent its members' activities to others, there
is an advantage stemming from having a tested theory which explains what
goes on i n the profession. A well constructed and tested descriptive theory of
concentration within the C P A industry would have been very useful i n the recent Metcalf hearings. Extensive economic studies of concentration have been
done for other industries. W h y has such a study not been done for C P A s ?
One problem is a lack of data, and one advantage of a professional association is
that it can give anonymity to individual data and at the same time report significant research results.
T h e social or governmental aspect of decision m a k i n g is characterized by
its large, heterogeneous constituency. A s government regulations are promulgated, the effects of complying w i t h these "rules of the game" are pervasive i n
their potential impact. A t this level, the major analytic difficulties stem from the
problems associated w i t h the construction of a social choice function. O n the
other hand, empirical problems surface i n the difficulties associated w i t h the
development of interpretive models for economy-wide phenomena. Yet, the i n dividual or group of individuals that set the "rules of the game" act as if they
have made a choice among the alternatives. It would appear that there is room
for descriptive models i n an auditing theory and that these models would provide for a tested theory which explains the effects of alternatives but does not
provide rules for choice.
A warning is provided to close this discussion of auditing practice. There
have been significant developments i n auditing research, yet if the earlier remarks are correct one can expect that there has not been a very rigorous logical
validation and testing of the claims. A t the individual auditor or firm level of
choice, there is then a danger i n using existing theory to design policies when
the theory is not well grounded, verified, and supported. Is it not more reasonable
to rely on intuition and experience than to shift to untested and possibly invalid
theories as a guide for policy making?
T h e last ten years i n accounting research have witnessed a problem i n the
use of theoretical structure. A s the efficient market research developed, the
emphasis has been on a continued testing and validation of the theory i n that
there was concern as to the conclusions that the delayed receipt of a set of
financial statements d i d not impact share prices. Instead of viewing this as a
model which d i d not explain why accounting is a pervasive activity it was, at
times, viewed as heresy. After ten years of pursuing a non-explanation, there
is an increasing tendency to look elsewhere for explanations. Ross (1977) and
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Beaver (1978) provide details on this point. In fact, understanding other uses
of accounting numbers such as for compensation contracts, bond indenture provisions and industry regulatory provisions may be likely explanations for the
activities taking place i n accounting and auditing, and these are not inconsistent
w i t h the efficient market results. Hakansson (1977) provides a clear and detailed picture of the comparative advantages of accounting information over
other types of information i n a market setting. H e concludes with the following
remark (p. 414):
However, the crucial point is that what is to be defined as a significant event and the amount of auditor involvement that is desirable
must be the result of data collection, analysis and calculation. N o one
is i n a position to spell out convincingly i n detail what is significant
enough to be disclosed immediately and what the auditor's role should
be without engaging i n . . . cost-benefit analysis.
T h e cost-benefit analysis suggested is that which looks at the effects on resource
allocations and considers the comparative advantage of alternative information
producers.
A Prospective on Auditing Theory
A reader of the proceedings of A u d i t i n g Symposium I (Stettler, 1972) may
believe that the change i n approach over the intervening years has been to now
have a paper on " T o w a r d a Theory of A u d i t i n g " as distinct from a paper on
" T o w a r d a Philosophy of A u d i t i n g " ( M a u t z , 1972). Is there anything new here,
or is this merely an unadvertised and well-developed "Columbus C o m p l e x " reflecting "Academic A m n e s i a " (Carmichael, 1976, p. 5)? T h e change to theory
is to emphasize the requirements for testing and validation. A s stated i n M a u t z
(1972, p. 85) the archaic definitions of philosophy included reasoned science
and the sciences as formerly studied i n the universities. O n the other hand,
included was the non-archaic definition that philosophy is knowledge of the general laws that furnish the rational explanation of anything. T h i s last definition
is consistent with part, but not all, of the requirements for a theory.
T h i s point is addressed by M a r i o Bunge (1967, p. 23) when he states:
In particular, no synthetic formula follows from analytic formulas
and no analytic formulas follow from synthetic ones; the mathematician
cannot infer anything about the world on the strength of his mathematical knowledge alone and, likewise, the physicist can establish no
mathematical theorem on the basis of his factual knowledge.
A n d , on science, Bunge (p. 29) states that:
What science claims is ( i ) to be truer than any non-scientific model
of the world, ( i i ) to be able to test such a truth claim, ( i i i ) to be able
to discover its own shortcomings, and (iv) to be able to correct its own
shortcomings, i.e., to build more and more adequate partial mappings
of the patterns of the world.
In essence, the advantage of theory or science is that it is tested with observations
from the world around us. Alternative and conflicting theories can be tried i n
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the courts of data. Prior to testing, the communication of the logic is presumed
to have taken place and to have been verified by others. T h e logic of the efficient
markets research has been the subject of scrutiny and it has been tested. In the
process, it has shown where accounting information is not very useful or valuable.
Considerable theoretical modeling and testing must likewise be done to show
how auditing is of value and the reasons w h y . Although solid results may be
decades away, it is not implied that the goal should not be pursued.
Questions raised w i t h i n a philosophy of auditing are recast within a theory
of auditing. F o r what and to w h o m auditors are responsible depends on answers
to questions about the value of auditing and the technology to supply audits.
Once a description of the demand for and supply of auditing is forthcoming,
individuals can decide whether to produce audits and whether to pay the price
for audits. T h i s simplification of the problem to one of demand and supply
analysis may appear to be extreme reductionism. O n the other hand, a descriptive
understanding of the world around us would appear to be a prerequisite to
policy m a k i n g questions.
Someone looking to the recorded auditing research should notice that a
complete, logically and empirically defensible theory that explains the auditor's
existence i n an economy is not present. Yet the same person may observe
auditors conducting audits, research reports describing what auditors are and
should be doing, and economic explanations of the functioning of an economy.
One might reasonably expect that with a wealth of research into the activities
of auditors and into descriptions of an economy w i t h uncertainty, that the two
could be brought together w i t h valuable results. C a n the described auditor activities be shown to enhance the economy's utilization of resources? C a n the
change i n the functioning of the economy w i t h the introduction of auditors be
evaluated i n terms of social or private benefits? W h a t motivations exist that
cause an individual to engage an auditor? These and other interesting questions
can be resolved only if the auditor is modeled into the economy in a direct way.
Earlier sections of this paper have omitted many specific references and
descriptions of existing research i n this area. H a m i l t o n (1978) provides a more
complete set of references and explanations and is available upon request. T h e
scope for this paper was too broad to permit the detailed explanations and references, but this is not to say that they are unimportant to the theme contained
herein. Recent developments along the lines suggested i n this paper are excellently summarized and communicated i n N g (1978). Thus, the focus i n this
paper has been on explaining some roles for a theory of auditing.
Where are we i n auditing theory? W h a t activities i n society are viewed
as auditing? H o w can these activities benefit f r o m having a well developed
theory of auditing? T h e preceding questions served as a frame for this paper
on the role of auditing theory.
W h a t can one expect from a paper such as this? Describing the current state
of auditing theory not only involves a given bibliographical set, but also involves
a view as to the meaning of theory. Interpersonal differences i n assessing the
state of auditing theory may be induced by either one or both of these elements.
Identifying the practice of auditing is obviously a definitional problem and establishing the "goodness" of one definition over another ultimately rests i n estab106

lishing the usefulness of the definition as a means for improving our understanding of auditing, improving auditing itself, and improving the world around
us. W i t h the personalistic nature of the first item, the measurement difficulties
associated w i t h the second and the impossibilities for constructing social welfare
measures for the third, there is reason to believe that a rigorous proof defending
the definition's usefulness could not be provided herein.
Demonstrating the impact of a well developed auditing theory on education
and practice is likewise exceedingly equivocal. Anyone who has tried to defend
a basic research proposal knows that the process is difficult and that the arguments are generally insufficient for showing that the project should be funded.
Yet, funded basic research projects provide a means for informed betting on
knowledge changes on the part of the researcher and the funding agency. A s i n
any area, some bets are won, others are lost.
I have developed a description of my betting positions and an explanation
of my reasons for taking these positions. I am sure that opening a market for
these bets would generate a significant amount of betting. I hope that future
developments i n auditing theory are such that all of our bets can eventually be
settled. Actions taken by C P A firms, auditors, congressional committees, regulatory agencies and others can also be viewed as falling w i t h i n a betting framework wherein the individuals who take the actions are placing their individual
welfare on the line.
Concluding Observations
T h e preceding sections of this paper have detailed why an auditing theory
does not appear to exist and how such a theory would be of value to auditing
educators and practitioners. Most basic to the viewpoint expressed here is that
the necessary conditions for a solution to all auditing problems have not been
established i n a theoretical structure which is shown to be consistent w i t h the
data from the world around us. These conditions are necessary for resolving
auditing problems such as choices among confirmation formats or analytic auditing approaches. A solution to these two problems, for example, requires either
that the value of auditing be established (a welfare economics viewpoint) or
that the auditor's penalty/reward structure be k n o w n (a microeconomic viewpoint). W i t h i n a setting where auditing is a valued activity, the penalty/reward
structure should be derived from the explanation of the demand for and supply
of auditing.
Individuals seeking resolution of auditing problems, whether the problems
be governmental, internal, or external w i l l demand that other conditions be
established for the variety of problems addressed. If auditing is an area of
specialization, then the necessary conditions w i l l explain why auditing is distinguished from other activities. Yet the conditions w i l l be only necessary, and
by no means sufficient, for resolving most of the interesting auditing problems.
A s noted earlier, it is an issue of priorities and the suggestion here is similar to
suggesting that climatic and geographic conditions are necessary conditions
which must be established before one proceeds to identify the specifics of the
problem of choosing a particular type of house and life style which is best for
the individual involved.
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